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APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
POINT I 
THE OLD FENCE IS THE BEST AND 
ONLY EVIDENCE OF THE STARTING 
POINT OF THE DESCRIPTION. 
Respondents seem to argue that the old fence 
cannot be relied upon as the beginning point because 
there is no evidence that it was built on the point "9.2 
1 
chains north of the center of the intersection". Re-
spondents at Page 6 of their brief urge this court to 
take judicial notice that old fences are often not 011 
the true line. This argument misses the whole point 
of appellants' contention as set forth in Points II 
' ' and III of appellants' main brief. Appellants there 
contend that when the property was originally laid 
out in 1875 in the deed from the patentee to Joseph 
Thompson, (abstract pg. 2) the point 9.2 chains north 
of the center of the intersection was designated to be 
in line with an old fence. The description says so and 
so· do 13 succeeding documents in the abstract right 
down to 1943. It matters not whether the original sur-
vey laying out the property was accurate or not,. It is 
sufficient that originally it was so designated and has 
been so practically located by everyone from 1875 to 
1963, a period of 88 years. All monuments, markers and 
pegs used in the 1875 survey have long since disap-
peared. The question now is where was the point 9.2 
chains north of the intersection originally located when 
the description was first employed in 187 5-not where 
it should have been located. As stated by Justice Cooley 
in Diehl v. Zanger, 39 Mich. 601, quoted with approval 
by the Supreme Court of Arizona in 'V acker v. Price, 
(1950) 70 Ariz. 99, 216 P. 2d 707: "Nothing is better 
understood than that few of our early plats will stand 
the test of a careful and accurate survey without dis-
closing errors. This is true of the government surveys 
as well as any others, and if all the lines were now 
subject to correction on new surveys, the confusion of 
2 
lines and titles that would follow would be simply in-
ealcula and the visitation of the surveyor might 
'' ;_'ll be set down as a great public calamity. But no 
law can sanction this course .... The question is not 
how an entirely accurate survey would locate these 
lots, but how the original stakes located them." Some 
courts have described this process of re-tracing the 
original survey as "fallowing the footsteps" of the 
original surveyor. 
There is another reason why it matters not that 
the old fence may not have been established exactly 
on the point 9.2 chains north of the center of the inter-
section. It is well recognized law that a call in a de-
scription to a specific point such as a fence line prevails 
over a distance. 11 CJS Sec. 51 on Boundaries. Thus, 
even though the fence was more or less than 9.2 chains 
north, the call to the fence governs and makes the fence 
the north boundary of the property. 
Respondents argue in their brief that the source 
of the dispute in this case is the failure of the appel-
lants to make reference to the fence when they conveyed 
the property to respondents in December, 1963. That 
is not so. Whether the fence is mentioned or not, all 
parties who have had anything to do with this prop-
erty since 1875 (including respondents when they pur-
chased it) have regarded this fence as the north bound-
ary. Appellants purchased it in 1943, had it surveyed 
by a Mr. McDonald, and found no problem. R. 151. 
This was 3 years before the first monument was ever 
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placed in the center of the intersection. The old fence 
monument itself of where the point 9.2 chains north 
of the intersection was originally located and where 
by practical location it was maintained for 88 years 
prior to respondents' purchase of the property. Re-
spondents suggest that when the reference to the fence 
is omitted, a different tract of property was conveyed 
than when the fence was specifically mentioned in 
earlier instruments. This argument overlooks the in-
tention of the parties which is paramount in construing 
a description in a deed. 26 CJS Sec. 100 on Deeds. It 
also overlooks the fence as the only monument remain-
ing of an early survey. Whether the fence is men-
tioned or not, the same north line viz. the old fence, 
has always been meant. 
Respondents apparently derive some comfort from 
the fact that all three surveyors at the trial said that 
in surveying the property today they would go about 
it as did Coon and King for the respondents. How-
ever, all three surveyors qualified their answers by 
saying that they do not, as surveyors, try 'to locate where 
the courts or the law would fix the property line. (R. 
81, 136, 144). In other words, they did not presume to 
know the law regarding location of old points. Robert 
Jones, the respondents' surveyor, acknowledged that 
in surveying it is proper to refer to earlier deeds in 
the chain of title to see if a call is made to a fence, but 
that in this instance he did not have the benefit of 
the abstract. (R. 89-90). He further acknowledged 
that the center of an intersection might change over 
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a period of 80 years and that this determination of 
where that point is today would not necessarily be the 
same as it was in 1875. (R. 82). This court in Reese 
v. Murdock, 121 Utah 517, 243 P. 2d 948, rejected 
the surveys of two private surveyors and the county 
surveyor and fixed the beginning point of the prop-
erty there involved at a point on an old fence line which 
by practical location of the parties had been the starting 
point for over 50 years. 
Respondents' argument would lead to the result 
that every time property is sold, the description must 
be checked with any new monuments which have been 
established, and if the description no longer fits, the 
description must be revised. Think of the chaos this 
would result in . When one owner revises his description 
to meet new surveys, it usually makes the new descrip-
tion conflict with the description of neighboring prop-
erty and a whole chain of conflicts is started. It was 
that situation which Justice Cooley in Diehl v. Zanger, 
39 Mich. 601, called a "great public calamity". 
In conclusion, there is no evidence to support 
Judge Elton's apparent determination that the starting 
point of the property was a few feet north of the old 
fence. The Coon and King survey was tied to a new 
monument established in 1946, and ignores the only 
monument of the original survey viz. the old fence. 
The law requires that the starting point be found as it 
was originally located. On that question, the old fence 
is the best and only evidence of where that point was 
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originally located. Additional reasons ·why the old 
fence should be regarded as the starting point are: 
I. 13 successive references to it in the chain of 
title as being the north boundary. 
2. Practical location of the starting point on the 
old fence by the owners thereof for 88 years. 
3. As pointed out at Page 22 of appellants' main 
brief, the description is ambiguous since the center of 
the intersection as now located will not fit the tie to 
the 16th corner, thereby increasing the necessity for 
reference to a point on the ground. 
4. The rule of law that an omission in a subse-
quent description cannot enlarge the boundaries of the 
land conveyed by deed. (See Page 24 of appellants' 
main brief) . 
5. The intention of the parties (respondents and 
appellants alike) that the fence was the north boundary 
when the property was bought and sold in December, 
1963. 
POINT II 
NONE OF THE COVENANTS OF THE 
\V ARRANTY DEED HA VE BEEN BROKEN. 
Respondents claim at Point III of their brief that 
because they did not get possession of the strip north 
of the old fence there has been a breach of the cove-
nants. They totally ignore the fact that the law requires 
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that they prove that the claimant Erekson has para-
mount :itle. Respondents blandly assert that Erekson 
i1<ts title by adverse possession or by acquiescence. Re-
spondents want this court to assume such facts. This 
court in Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 226 Pac. 
460, made the grantee prove that the third party claim-
ant had paramount title by bringing suit against him 
first. Van Cott v. Casper, 53 Utah 161, 176 Pac. 849. 
Matters of priority of titles are never assumed. They 
are proved in courts of law when all interested parties 
are parties litigant. The authorities relied upon by 
respondents at Pages 9 and IO of their brief require 
that the claimant have paramount title. That has never 
been shown because respondents have never tested 
Erekson's title. They want this court to save them that 
trouble and assume that Erekson's title is paramount. 
They even want to assume that Erekson' s description 
fits up against the old fence, which is contrary to their 
contention that they were conveyed the strip north 
of the old fence. Also, if respondents are correct that 
their description included the strip north of the old 
fence, then appellants and their predecessors in title 
have been paying the taxes upon it since 1875, and 
adverse possession by Erekson would have been im-
possible. 
If this court can assume, as respondents urge, that 
Erekson owns up to the old north fence by the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence, then this court should 
also assume that appellants owned up to the fences on 
the east and south of the property, and hence it was 
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unnecessary for respondents to spend any time or money 
in obtaining quitclaim deeds from the adjoining owners 
on the east (.Ferguson) and the south (Aoki ana Al-
paugh). 
POINT III 
Respondents do not cite any authority whatever 
in opposition to the authorities in Point V of appel-
lants' main brief to the effect that in a breach of cove-
nant suit, attorney's fees are not recoverable when 
incurred in clearing clouds from the title. They do 
not cite any authority contrary to appellants' statement 
that attorney's fees can be recovered in a breach of 
covenant action only when the fees were expended in 
the unsuccessful defense of the title conveyed such as 
occurred in Van Cott v. Jacklin, 63 Utah 412, 236 
Pac. 460. Respondents simply ignore these authorities 
and plead that the title conveyed was "defective'', that 
respondents had to "satisfy" their grantees, and that 
they were mitigating damages when they obtained the 
quitclaim deeds from Ferguson, Aoki and Alpaugh. 
No cases have been cited, however, where attorney's 
fees were allowed under the guise of mitigating dam-
ages. If the court were to so allow them it would be 
going further than any case found by appellants. This 
court should adhere to the rule of Van Cott v. Jacklin 
supra, Sec. 57-1-12, UCA 1953, and the cases at 61 
ALR 169, and allow fees only when incurred in the 
unsuccessful defense of the title conveyed. There was 
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111• litigation here and respondents incurred no fees in 
def c ·1ding the title conveyed. 
Respondents have mistaken the law as to the lia-
bility of the grantors-appellants to them. In their brief 
at Pages 4, IO, 11 and 12, they mention what respond-
ents did to "satisfy" their grantee ( Sieverts Brothers) 
and argue that appellants are liable for that cost. The 
law does not impose the duty on the warrantor to 
"satisfy" the grantee or successive grantees. The lia-
bility of the warrantor is specifically defined in Sec. 
57-1-12, UCA 1953, and nowhere does the word "sat-
isfy" there appear. The duty imposed is to protect 
against "lawful claims". As this court held in Utah 
Savings and Trust v. Stoutt, 36 Utah 206, 102 Pac. 
865, the covenants do not even protect against an un-
marketable title. Thus, even if we were to assume that 
appellants conveyed respondents an unmarketable title, 
respondents cannot recover anything in this suit for 
breach of covenants. Their remedy would have been 
to have sued upon the real estate contract, but an 
action would have to be brought before the execution 
and delivery of the warranty deed. This is because 
the contract is merged into the deed and thereafter the 
grantor-seller is liable, if at all, only on the covenants 
of the deed and the terms of the contract cannot be 
sued upon. See Utah Savings and Trust Co. v. Stoutt, 
supra, and Knight v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 
42, 176 Pac. 689. 
There was no suit between the respondents and 
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their grantee and hence, there has been no judicial 
determination of whether the demands of Sieverts · 
Brothers were lawful or not. Clearly, appelbnts are 
not liable for costs expended by respondents to "satisfy" 
Sieverts Brothers. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD C. HOWE 
Attorney for Appellants 
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